Key takeaways
- Ransomware is rarer than phishing but far more disruptive, and most small organisations have no formal plan for it.
- The first hour decides the outcome: isolate, call your IT provider, protect backups, and switch to agreed offline routines.
- Backups only help if at least one copy is offline, separate from the network, and has been restored in a test.
- If patient data may have been accessed, the breach must usually be reported to the regulator within 72 hours of becoming aware.
Why a small practice needs a written plan
Ransomware encrypts your systems and usually steals data first, then demands payment. It is less common than phishing, but rising: in the 2025 government survey, the share of UK businesses reporting ransomware increased from less than 0.5% in 2024 to 1%[1]. Preparation is thin. Only 23% of businesses had a formal incident response plan, although 83% had backups of some kind[1].
For a practice, the stakes are clinical as well as financial. Losing the clinical system, telephony and email at once can stop prescribing, results handling and urgent appointments. Patient records are special category data[2], so a ransomware attack that copies them is also a serious data breach.
The first hour
Minute 0: isolate
Disconnect affected devices from the network and Wi-Fi without switching them off, so evidence is preserved. Ask staff to stop using shared drives.
Minute 5: call your IT provider
Use the emergency number from the printed contact sheet, not from email. For practices with commissioned IT, that may be the ICB's provider; for private clinics, your managed service company.
Minute 10: protect backups
Confirm with IT that offline backups are disconnected and untouched. Do not plug a backup drive into any device until IT says it is safe.
Minute 15: switch to offline routines
The duty manager opens the continuity pack: paper appointment lists, manual prescription process, and the phone message for patients.
Minute 30: tell the people who must know
The partners or owner, your clinical lead, your information governance lead or data protection officer, and your insurer's incident line if you have cover.
Minute 60: start the incident log
Record what happened, when, who did what and every decision. You will need it for the regulator, your insurer and any police report.
Do not pay or negotiate on your own. The National Cyber Security Centre notes that law enforcement do not encourage, endorse or condone the payment of ransom demands, and paying does not guarantee you get your data back[3].
Backups that survive an attack
Attackers look for backups first, because deleting them forces payment. The NCSC advises regular backups of your most important files, offline backups kept separate and ideally off site, multiple copies using different backup solutions and locations, backup devices that are not permanently connected to the network, and regular tests that you can actually restore[3].
- Know which systems you back up yourself and which your suppliers back up. NHS clinical systems are hosted by suppliers; private clinic software may not be.
- Keep at least one copy that is offline or immutable, so ransomware cannot reach it.
- Do not treat cloud file-sync tools as your only backup; they faithfully sync encrypted files too.
- Test a full restore at least once a year and record how long it took.
- Store the passwords needed to restore somewhere that does not depend on the systems you are restoring.
Offline routines: decide them now
The continuity plan should name a person responsible, list key functions, set a maximum acceptable disruption time for each, and describe how each will be restored within that time. Keep a printed copy off site and another in a sealed envelope at reception.
| Function | Maximum disruption | Offline fallback |
|---|---|---|
| Urgent clinical contact | None | Duty clinician on a mobile; paper triage notes scanned in later |
| Today's appointments | Under one hour | Printed or exported day list refreshed each evening |
| Prescriptions | Same day | Agreed process with local pharmacies and the ICB for urgent medicines |
| Telephony | Under one hour | Supplier's emergency divert to a mobile; recorded message |
| Results and letters | One to two days | Ask labs and hospitals to phone abnormal results to the duty clinician |
| Payments (private) | Several days | Card terminal on mobile data; manual receipts |
What to tell patients
Patients will phone first. Prepare a recorded message and a website notice in advance so nobody has to draft them under pressure. A simple version: ‘We are experiencing a problem with our computer systems. If you need urgent help, please stay on the line. For life-threatening emergencies call 999. For urgent medical advice when we cannot help, use NHS 111. Please do not come to the practice unless you have an appointment.’
Do not speculate in public about the cause or whether data was taken. Say what patients need to do, and update the message as the situation changes. If you later need to tell affected patients that their data was accessed, write that letter with your data protection officer.
Reporting a breach
If ransomware may have exposed patient data, treat it as a personal data breach. UK GDPR requires notification to the regulator without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours of becoming aware of it, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to people's rights and freedoms; a later notification must give reasons for the delay[4]. You must also document every breach, including its facts, effects and the remedial action taken[4].
NHS practices also report through the Data Security and Protection Toolkit's incident tool, which routes serious incidents to the right national teams. Serious UK GDPR infringements can attract fines of up to £17.5 million or 4% of turnover[5], but in practice the regulator looks hardest at whether you had reasonable security and acted quickly.
Example: a tabletop exercise in 45 minutes
Example: the managers of Fenwick Medical Centre, a fictional practice, run a tabletop exercise at a lunchtime meeting. The scenario: at 8.05 on a Monday, reception screens show a ransom note. The team walks through the first-hour steps using only the printed pack.
Example: three gaps emerge. The IT emergency number in the pack is out of date, nobody knows how to divert the phone lines without logging in to the telephony portal, and the printed day list is a week old. The manager updates the contact sheet, asks the telephony supplier for a divert code that works by phone, and adds an evening export of the next day's list to the closing checklist.
Roles on the day
In a small practice the same few people do everything, which is exactly why roles need writing down. When the clinical system goes dark at 8am, nobody should be deciding who calls whom.
- Incident lead: usually the practice manager or a partner. Makes decisions, keeps the log and is the single point of contact for IT.
- Clinical lead: decides which clinical work continues, how urgent requests are triaged on paper and which patients need a call.
- Reception lead: switches phones and the front desk to the offline script and keeps a paper record of every contact.
- Communications: updates the phone message, website and any notice on the door, using pre-agreed wording.
- Deputy for each role, in case the person named is on leave or cannot be reached.
Print the role cards with the contact sheet and keep a copy off site. An action card that tells someone what to do in the first ten minutes is worth more than a long policy nobody reads under pressure.
Recovery and the days after
Restore in priority order
Bring back telephony and clinical access first, then email and shared drives. Your IT provider should rebuild from clean backups rather than trying to clean infected machines.
Reset credentials
Assume passwords were stolen. Reset passwords for every account, starting with admin and email, and check multi-factor authentication on each.
Back-enter paper records
Clinicians add consultations, prescriptions and messages handled on paper to the record as soon as systems return, with the original date and a note.
Check what was taken
Work with your IT provider and data protection officer to establish whether data was copied, which patients are affected and whether they need to be told.
Review and update the plan
Within a month, hold a short review: what worked, what did not, and what changes to make before the next incident.
Prevention is the cheaper plan
Most ransomware arrives through phishing, stolen passwords or unpatched devices, so the continuity plan sits alongside prevention. Train staff to report suspicious messages (phishing training), stop shared logins (smartcards and shared logins), work through Cyber Essentials, and check what clinicians use for quick messages (WhatsApp in clinical settings). Weather and power cuts test the same plan, so align it with your severe weather closures routine.
Frequently asked questions
Should a practice pay a ransom?
Law enforcement do not encourage, endorse or condone paying ransoms, and paying does not guarantee recovery[3]. Involve your IT provider, insurer and data protection officer before any decision.
Do we have to report a ransomware attack?
If personal data may have been accessed or lost, usually yes: notify the regulator within 72 hours of becoming aware unless the breach is unlikely to result in risk to people[4].
How often should we test backups?
At least once a year as a full restore, and after any major system change. Record how long it took.
What should the phone message say during an outage?
That systems are down, how to get urgent help, 999 for emergencies and NHS 111 for urgent advice, and not to attend without an appointment.
References
GOV.UK (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology) (2025). Cyber security breaches survey 2025 (opens in a new tab) ↑
legislation.gov.uk (The National Archives) (2026). UK GDPR Article 9: Processing of special categories of personal data (opens in a new tab) ↑
National Cyber Security Centre (2026). Mitigating malware and ransomware attacks (opens in a new tab) ↑
legislation.gov.uk (The National Archives) (2026). UK GDPR Article 33: Notification of a personal data breach (opens in a new tab) ↑
legislation.gov.uk (The National Archives) (2026). UK GDPR Article 83: General conditions for imposing administrative fines (opens in a new tab) ↑